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ABSTRACT 
Scholars have not taken adequate account of variation in the interest arbitration process in their 
research on the effects of interest arbitration on bargaining outcomes. There are two fundamental 
approaches to interest arbitration, which they term the "judicial prototype" and the "negotiation 
prototype." The recent cases involving the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association (PBA) of New York City 
and the city of New York illustrate the differences in these two approaches. There is a relationship 
between the arbitration prototype and the bargaining power of the parties. A party with greater 
bargaining power should prefer the negotiation prototype in interest arbitration. The New York City 
police cases—especially the effects of the attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001—
are analyzed to determine whether changes in the parties' bargaining power affected their approach to 
interest arbitration. 
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The rise of unionism among public sector employees in the 1960s led to the passage of state-level 
legislation regulating collective bargaining between state and local governments and their employees. In 
the vast majority of states that passed such legislation, public sector employees were denied the right to 
strike, and legislators established impasse procedures as a substitute for the right to strike as a means of 
resolving public sector disputes. For police officers and firefighters, in approximately 30 states the law 
requires that if the parties fail to reach agreement on a new contract through negotiation (and in most 
of these states mediation) then they must submit their dispute to arbitration. 1 The collective bargaining 
relationship between the PBA and New York City helps illustrate the contrast between the judicial 
approach and the negotiation approach to interest arbitration. 2 
 
Research on the Effect of Interest Arbitration on the Bargaining Process and Outcomes 
After the rise of public sector bargaining in the 1960s, researchers made a considerable effort to use 
empirical data and rigorous statistical methods to determine whether and to what extent interest 
arbitration affects salaries, compensation, and other bargaining outcomes. Research in the 1960s and 
1970s explored whether arbitrated outcomes were significantly different from negotiated outcomes, or 
whether outcomes arrived at through conventional arbitration differed significantly from outcomes 
arrived at through final offer arbitration. Missing from this body of research, however, was any effort to 
include in a statistical model a variable that denotes a critical dimension of arbitration—namely, the 
distinction between the judicial approach and the negotiation approach. Accounting for this dimension 
is essential in understanding the arbitration process and its effects on outcomes. Practitioners and 
researchers need to recognize that understanding the nature and effects of interest arbitration requires 
looking into the "black box" of the arbitration process.  
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 There is a surprising lack of recent research on the use of interest arbitration to resolve police 
and fire disputes. In 1996 a report by a taskforce appointed by the U.S. secretary of labor noted "a surge 
of scholarly interest in public sector labor relations" in the 1960s and 1970s. The taskforce pointed out 
that as public sector bargaining laws matured, "conflict declined and the challenges in the field 
diminished or held less interest for academics," with the consequence that in recent years there has 
been "an almost total lack of academic research—despite the fact that demands and pressures on the 
public workplace have been increasing.” 3 
 During the period when scholars did focus their energies on interest arbitration in the public 
sector, they concentrated principally on two important topics: (1) the effect of the availability and use of 
interest arbitration on bargaining outcomes, particularly salaries, 4 and (2) the effect of interest 
arbitration on the parties' incentives to negotiate and settle contracts on their own. 5 With respect to 
the former effect, many researchers and practitioners suspected that interest arbitration would 
significantly increase police and fire salaries. Implicitly, if not explicitly, researchers seemed to believe 
that the effect of interest arbitration on salaries would be analogous to the effect of collective 
bargaining itself, and in particular that it would constitute an intrusion on management's unilateral 
authority to set salaries and result in salaries that would be higher than would otherwise be dictated by 
market factors. Whether arbitrated salaries would be significantly different from salaries negotiated by 
the parties through collective bargaining was a different matter, however, and some researchers 
attempted to estimate the effect of arbitration independent of the effect of collective bargaining. 
 With respect to the latter effect, many experts believed that the use of conventional interest 
arbitration—the form of arbitration that gives the arbitrator broad authority to fashion an award—
would decrease the parties' incentives to negotiate their own agreement (the so-called "chilling effect") 
and eventually result in the parties' dependence on outside parties to settle their disputes (the so-called 
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"narcotic effect"). In a seminal article published in 1966, Carl Stevens suggested that the chilling effect of 
conventional interest arbitration could be overcome if the arbitrator's authority was restricted to 
choosing the final offer of either the union or the employer. The availability of so-called "final offer 
arbitration," Stevens claimed, would provide the parties with strong incentives to negotiate and settle 
contracts on their own, without the necessity of relying on an outsider to determine their contract. 6 
Stevens' proposal came along at a propitious moment: policymakers and scholars were searching for 
effective methods of controlling the rising tide of conflict in the public sector workplace, and final offer 
arbitration was an intriguing innovation. About 10 states subsequently adopted the technique for 
resolving police and fire disputes.'' 
 Empirical research on these two effects certainly did not result in uniform or consistent findings, 
and researchers and practitioners continue to disagree on the precise effects of interest arbitration on 
the bargaining process and bargaining outcomes. Nevertheless, most scholars agree on several 
generalizations. Regarding the effect of interest arbitration on bargaining outcomes, it does not seem to 
have had dramatic effects on the pay and compensation of police officers and firefighters. The salaries 
of police officers and firefighters in municipalities that have used interest arbitration are not significantly 
different from comparable salaries in municipalities that have not used interest arbitration. This finding 
suggests that within a given jurisdiction there may not be a significant difference between agreements 
reached through collective bargaining negotiations and contracts imposed on the parties through 
interest arbitration. However, the availability of interest arbitration seems to have had a positive 
influence on salaries, regardless of whether the parties have actually made use of the procedure. 
According to a leading textbook, "A number of researchers have found that the availability of interest 
arbitration has led to slightly higher wage settlements and more favorable nonwage contract terms. In 
some states there is also evidence of less variation in collective bargaining outcomes across 
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municipalities that make interest arbitration available although this leveling effect of interest arbitration 
has not been found in some other states." 8 
 Regarding the effect of interest arbitration on the bargaining process, in virtually all jurisdictions 
the vast majority of collective bargaining contracts are settled voluntarily by the parties without 
resorting to arbitration. Lester found that in states where it was available, interest arbitration was used 
to resolve between six and 29 percent of negotiations. 9 It appears, however, that final offer arbitration 
does provide a greater incentive for the parties to settle on their own than does conventional 
arbitration: arbitration usage rates are significantly lower in states with final offer arbitration than they 
are in states with conventional arbitration. The evidence also suggests that in general, interest 
arbitration does not result in a narcotic effect. 10 
 
Public Sector Collective Bargaining in New York 
In New York State, collective bargaining by public employees is governed by the Taylor Law. 11 In New 
York during the 1960s, public sector labor relations went through a period of strife and tumult. 
Especially noteworthy was the strike by the transit workers in New York City, which began on New Year's 
Day 1966 and continued for eleven more days. At the time, the Condon-Wadlin Law, passed in 1947, 
governed public sector labor relations in New York State. Injunctions were issued against the transit 
strikers, but they failed to stop the strike. It appeared obvious to most observers that the Condon-
Wadlin Act was a wholly ineffective means of controlling public sector labor relations in the state. 
 In the wake of the transit strike. Governor Nelson Rockefeller appointed a Committee on Public 
Employee Relations, chaired by Professor George Taylor of the University of Pennsylvania, which he 
charged to "make legislative proposals for protecting the public against the disruption of vital public 
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services by illegal strikes, while at the same time protecting the rights of public employees." 12 The 
Taylor Committee recommended that the legislature pass a new, comprehensive public sector statute to 
replace the Condon-Wadlin Act. The legislature, after considerable debate, by and large adopted the 
recommendations of the Taylor Committee and the bill passed by the legislature was signed into law by 
Governor Rockefeller in April 1967 (the effective date of the law was September 1, 1967). The Taylor 
Law is administered by the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB), which in some ways parallels the 
National Labor Relations Board, except that PERB has responsibility not only for representation issues 
and improper practices (i.e., unfair labor practices) but also for overseeing the law's impasse 
procedures. 
 The Taylor Law included a so-called "local option" section that allowed New York municipalities 
to set up their own "mini PERBs" so long as their procedures were substantially equivalent to those in 
the state law. 13 In 1966, a year before the passage of the Taylor Law, Mayor John V Lindsay and the 
public sector unions in New York City reached an agreement establishing an impartial, tripartite agency 
"to serve as the neutral in the City's labor relations.” 14 The following year the New York City Council 
enacted the New York City Collective Bargaining Law (NYCCBL), which was implemented by an Executive 
Order issued by Mayor Lindsay. 15 The tripartite agency established earlier became the Office of 
Collective Bargaining (OCB) under the NYCCBL. OCB remains an independent and impartial agency of city 
government, operating under the local option section of the Taylor Law. 16 OCB has two general 
responsibilities: It conducts formal legal proceedings on such matters as representation questions, 
improper practices, scope of bargaining disputes, and the arbitrability of unresolved grievances, and it 
also administers the law's dispute resolution procedures, designating mediators, interest arbitrators, 
and grievance arbitrators. 17 
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 The Taylor Law gave public sector employees in New York State the right to engage in collective 
bargaining but not the right to strike. Nevertheless, in the two years following the passage of the law 
there were nearly forty strikes by public sector employees in the state. Most notably New York City 
sanitation workers went on strike in February 1968 and in both the spring and fall of that year the 
United Federation of Teachers struck the New York City School District, causing the loss of 58 school 
days for most children in the district. 18 Lawmakers in Albany came to believe that weaknesses in the 
original Taylor Act, particularly with respect to impasse procedures and strike penalties, needed to be 
corrected. In 1969 the law was significantly amended. First, the legislature added a series of so-called 
"improper practices" to the law that were largely analogous to the unfair labor practices included in the 
Taft-Hartley Act. Second, the 1969 amendments empowered public sector employers to enter into 
agreements with their unions to submit impasses in new contract negotiations to arbitration; that is, the 
act encouraged the parties to use voluntary interest arbitration. 19 Third, the 1969 amendments 
strengthened the anti-strike provisions of the Taylor Law, removing statutory ceilings on the fines that 
could be imposed on striking unions and, most notably adding penalties directed at individual strikers. 
The law now called for any public employee on strike to be penalized an amount equal to two days of 
pay for every day that employee was on strike. 20 
 Although the Taylor Law requires the NYCCBL to be "substantially equivalent" to the state law, 
there have always been significant differences. With respect to the resolution of impasses, from its 
inception OCB procedures have provided "finality by interest arbitration of all contract disputes to all 
covered employees." 21 
 By contrast, the Taylor Law did not initially mandate interest arbitration for any public sector 
employees within its jurisdiction. In 1974, however, amendments were added to the Taylor Law 
requiring interest arbitration for police officers and firefighters. 22 (Both the NYCCBL and the Taylor Law 
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call for the use oi conventional and not final offer interest arbitration. 23) The interest arbitration 
provisions in the NYCCBL are a permanent part of the law, but the interest arbitration provisions in the 
Taylor Law have always had a sunset provision, which is currently July 1, 2007. Also, an interest 
arbitration award under the NYCCBL does not become binding until the appropriate legislative body 
enacts a law implementing it, whereas an interest arbitration award under the Taylor Law is binding on 
the local jurisdiction without the enactment of implementing legislation. 24 Another significant 
difference is that arbitration panels appointed by OCB consist entirely of neutrals, while the panels 
appointed by PERB are tripartite in nature. 25 A tripartite panel consisting of an impartial chairperson 
and an arbitrator appointed by each of the parties functions in a measurably different fashion from a 
panel consisting of three impartial arbitrators. The former more closely approximates the negotiation 
approach to interest arbitration and the latter the judicial approach. We will expand on this proposition 
later. 
 
The Transfer of Interest Arbitration from OCB to PERB 
Over time the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association (PBA) and the Uniformed Firefighters Association 
(UFA) in New York City became increasingly frustrated with interest arbitration under OCB. In the 1990s 
both unions sought to have responsibility for police and fire impasse procedures transferred from OCB 
to PERB, and they lobbied in the state legislature in Albany for an amendment to the Taylor Law that 
would achieve that goal. New York City police officers in the 1990s had become highly dissatisfied with 
their salaries, which they believed lagged seriously behind police salaries in both comparable local and 
national jurisdictions. In every round of bargaining since 1968 the PBA and the city had reached impasse 
and had submitted their dispute to arbitration. With each award, the PBA believed, police salaries in 
New York City seemed to slip further and further behind police salaries in comparable jurisdictions. The 
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PBA placed a substantial part of the blame on OCB. In testimony before the New York City Council, PBA 
President Patrick Lynch characterized OCB "as nothing more than an arm of the Mayor's Office of Labor 
Relations that no longer served any useful purpose and should be abolished.” 26 The mayor, of course, 
disagreed with the PBA 3and the UFA, and he sought to retain OCB jurisdiction over interest arbitration. 
 In the view of the PBA and the UFA, interest arbitration under OCB suffered from several major 
flaws. For example, they believed OCB was too much in the sway of New York City politics, whereas 
PERB necessarily had a statewide perspective. Of particular concern to the unions was the prominence 
of so-called "pattern bargaining" in New York City labor relations. In every round of bargaining the 
mayor's Office of Labor Relations insisted that police and firefighter salaries should follow the pattern 
set by the settlements it had reached with the other unions in the city especially the city's settlement 
with its largest union. District Council 37 of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal 
Employees. 27 Over the course of several rounds of bargaining, the city and District Council 37 
negotiated agreements containing modest wage increases. The police and firefighter unions maintained 
that conforming to the so-called pattern in New York City only served to increase the differential 
between their salaries and the salaries of police officers and firefighters in comparable jurisdictions. 
There was some irony in this situation: The city insisted on the sanctity of the pattern, whereas the 
police and firefighter unions demanded that the pattern be broken; in the private sector typically it has 
been unions that insist on conformity with a pattern and employers that want flexibility. 28 The PBA and 
UFA were certain the only way their members could escape "lockstep" bargaining in New York City was 
to have PERB assume jurisdiction over interest arbitration. Both unions came to believe that they would 
have a better chance at winning higher salaries from a PERB-appointed tripartite panel than they would 
from an OCB-appointed all-neutral one. 
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 In 1996 the state legislature passed legislation transferring jurisdiction over New York City police 
officer and firefighter impasses from OCB to PERB. At the urging of New York City Mayor Rudolph 
Giuliani, Governor George Pataki vetoed the bill. 29 The legislature, however, overrode the governor's 
veto—only the second time the legislature had done so in 125 years. 30 But the New York State Court of 
Appeals ruled that the law was unconstitutional because the new legislation violated home rule 
principles and "did not implicate a substantial statewide concern.” 31 Two years later the legislature 
again attempted to transfer jurisdiction to PERB, passing a bill that sponsors believed corrected the 
defect identified by the Court of Appeals in the earlier legislation. This time the governor, despite the 
continuing objections of Mayor Giuliani, signed the bill into law. 32 Again New York City contested the 
constitutionality of the law in the state courts, but the Court of Appeals decided that the legislature had 
successfully corrected the imperfections of the original version. The high court ruled that the new 
version did not single out New York City but applied "to all local governments in that none are permitted 
to require their police or fire unions to forego access to PERB and instead utilize a mini-PERB established 
by the locality" The new statute, the court held, was enacted in furtherance of "a substantial statewide 
concern"—in particular, the "orderly resolution of collective bargaining disputes involving police and fire 
bargaining units." 33 
 In 2001, when the Court of Appeals approved the transfer of jurisdiction to PERB, the PBA was 
entering a new round of bargaining with New York City. As the PBA and the city moved toward impasse 
that year, for the first time PERB had direct authority over the impasse procedures applicable under the 
Taylor Law. Arbitration was expected to occur sometime in 2002; the attack on the World Trade Center 
occurred on September 11. Of the 2,726 people killed at the World Trade Center on that terrible day 23 
were New York City police officers and 37 were Port Authority police officers. 34 
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The Judicial Prototype v. the Negotiation Prototype 
There are two fundamental approaches to or styles of interest arbitration. We will call them the judicial 
prototype and the negotiation prototype. Arbitrators and advocates who explicitly or implicitly hold to 
the judicial prototype view interest arbitration as identical or closely analogous to a civil trial. The 
arbitrator in the judicial prototype needs to be scrupulous in adhering to proper procedures, including 
the use of discovery, the examination and cross-examination of witnesses, and the admissibility of 
evidence. The arbitrator's goal in the judicial prototype is to render an award based squarely on the 
record presented by the parties that matches or at least closely approximates a decision that would 
have been made by a judge in an analogous civil trial. 
 In contrast, those who hold to the negotiation prototype view interest arbitration in a much less 
formal or legalistic manner. An arbitrator subscribing to the negotiation prototype would be much less 
concerned about the use of courtroom procedures and would in fact be eager to encourage the parties 
to negotiate a resolution of their dispute even in the midst of a hearing. In this prototype the arbitrator 
is perfectly willing to play the role of a mediator in assisting the parties to reach an agreement. If 
required to issue an award, the arbitrator's goal is to produce one that is identical to or at least closely 
approximates a deal the parties might have negotiated on their own. 35 
 The two constructs posited here are obviously metaphors, and a metaphor can be useful in 
helping gain insight into the essential nature of a phenomenon. Another metaphor has frequently been 
used to describe interest arbitration—"legislative." An interest arbitrator's function, consistent with the 
legislative metaphor, is to write the "laws" that will govern the parties' relationship during the term of 
the contract. Scholars who have used the legislative metaphor seek a construct that will aptly apply to 
interest arbitration in general. Interest arbitration always requires writing rules that will govern the 
parties' future relationship. In contrast, a means of describing variation in the interest arbitration 
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process is sought. Variation in the arbitration process should help explain variation in arbitration 
outcomes. 
 As noted, apart from the broadest distinctions (e.g., between conventional arbitration and final 
offer arbitration) previous researchers have not recognized and included in their statistical models other 
sources of variation in the arbitration process. Whether a given jurisdiction uses conventional or final 
offer arbitration is likely to influence the extent to which arbitrators and advocates adhere to the judicial 
or negotiation prototype. As noted earlier, conventional arbitration gives arbitrators the broadest 
authority to fashion an award, whereas final offer arbitration strictly limits the arbitrator's authority. 
Accordingly one might well hypothesize that conventional arbitration gives arbitrators the most latitude 
to negotiate a settlement with the parties, whereas final offer arbitration dictates that the arbitrator 
adopt the judicial prototype. On the other hand, conventional arbitration is widely thought to have a 
chilling effect on negotiation, whereas final offer arbitration is designed to promote negotiation 
between the parties. It was noted earlier that empirical research indicates that there are significantly 
more negotiated settlements in jurisdictions using final offer arbitration than there are in jurisdictions 
using conventional arbitration. This evidence suggests a contrary hypothesis—specifically that the 
negotiation prototype is more likely to be used in final offer jurisdictions than in jurisdictions using 
conventional arbitration. Only further empirical evidence can cast light on which hypothesis is the 
correct one. 
 Significant variation in the arbitration process is likely to exist even within the same statutory 
framework. Further, the distinction between the judicial approach and the negotiation approach is one 
that is capable of capturing a significant proportion of the variation in the arbitration process and is a 
good proxy for other dimensions of interest arbitration, and collective bargaining more generally, that 
are thought to influence outcomes. 
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 Whether and to what extent the two approaches affect arbitration outcomes in practice is in the 
end an empirical question. A negotiations approach might be more efficient at matching the parties' 
preferences (i.e., it is probably more integrative), especially when the dialogue promoted by the 
presence of party-appointed representatives allows the arbitration panel to hone in on desirable 
tradeoffs and needs when fashioning its award. In contrast, a judicial approach might lead an arbitration 
panel to be more responsive in its award to environmental and economic circumstances. Legislative-
style arbitrators have the opportunity to shape an award to fit those circumstances because they are 
more insulated from the parties' preferences and power. 
 
A Spectrum, Not a Dichotomy 
All arbitration cases can be arrayed along a spectrum anchored on one end by the negotiation prototype 
and on the other end by the judicial prototype. It is likely that the majority of interest arbitration cases 
do not belong at either end of this spectrum but fall somewhere in between. Whether the arbitrators 
and the parties in any particular case are inclined toward the judicial prototype or the negotiation 
prototype will obviously significantly affect the arbitration process, and the nature of the process will 
affect the nature of the outcomes. But social scientists who have studied interest arbitration have failed 
to take account of this critical dimension in their research. 
 
Factors Determining the Arbitration Prototype 
There are two factors that determine which prototype is used in an arbitration case. The first factor (we 
will term it the legal environment) consists of the applicable statutes, court decisions, and prevailing 
arbitration practices that apply in the jurisdiction in which an arbitration case arises. The second factor is 
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the preferences of the arbitrator and the parties. Regarding the first factor, the transfer of jurisdiction 
over police and fire impasses from OCB to PERB in 2001 constituted a highly significant change in the 
legal environment of police and fire arbitration cases in New York City As previously noted, under OCB 
impasse panels in arbitration cases have always consisted of three impartial arbitrators; under PERB an 
arbitration panel consists of one impartial chairman, a member appointed by the union, and a member 
appointed by the employer. An all-neutral panel is likely to be closer to the judicial end of the spectrum 
and a tripartite panel to the negotiation end. 
 There are constraints on the form and nature of communications that can occur between 
members of an all-neutral panel and the parties in a dispute during the course of an arbitration 
proceeding. 36 By contrast, there are virtually no constraints on communications between party-
appointed arbitrators and their constituents. Ex parte communication is the norm for party-appointed 
arbitrators before, during, and after formal hearings. A party-appointed arbitrator can play a significant 
role in shaping the strategy the union or the employer pursues in arbitration and, in deliberations with 
the impartial chair and the other party-appointed arbitrator, frequently assumes the role of the principal 
advocate or negotiator for the party he or she represents. However, in the conduct of the formal 
hearings, a party-appointed arbitrator plays a role similar if not identical to the role played by the 
impartial chair. On balance though, the use of a tripartite panel, compared to the use of an all-neutral 
one, expands the opportunity for negotiation significantly.  
 Of course the arbitrator and the parties do not have total discretion in choosing the approach 
they prefer but need to work within the constraints imposed by the legal environment. Nevertheless, in 
most jurisdictions, within these constraints, the parties have considerable latitude in shaping the arbitral 
process they prefer. In New York typically the chair of the impasse panel will meet with the parties in 
advance of formal hearings to discuss and agree upon the procedures that will govern the hearings. In 
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the 2002 PBA case the chair of the impasse panel, Dana Eischen, pressed both parties to agree upon a 
tight time frame for completing the hearings. Because he wanted to expedite the hearings, he obtained 
the parties' agreement to use narrative testimony and limited cross-examination. In contrast, in the 
2004-05 case, the chair of the arbitration panel, Eric Schmertz, proposed a schedule of hearings that 
included nearly twice as many days as Eischen had allowed. Given the more expansive schedule, the 
arbitrator and the parties agreed to a more traditional approach to the direct and cross-examination of 
witnesses. Eischen's preference for a more informal and flexible approach encouraged negotiation, 
whereas Schmertz's more traditional approach made the hearings more like a conventional trial. 
 
Bargaining Power and Interest Arbitration 
Social scientists believe that outcomes (or agreements) reached through negotiation are more likely to 
be a function of the relative bargaining power of the parties and less likely to be a function of the 
relative merits of each party's case. 38 By contrast, they believe that an impartial judge, empowered to 
make a decision in a dispute, is more likely to base his or her decision on the merits of the case and not 
on the power of the parties. Accordingly, we hypothesize that a party in an interest arbitration case that 
believes it has more power than its adversary will favor a process that allows greater scope for 
negotiation (or mediation by the arbitrator). By the same token, a party that has—or believes it has—
more bargaining power will favor a statutory regime that allows the parties more opportunity to 
negotiate. 
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The Effect of 9/11 
Does the police arbitration experience in New York City support these hypotheses? An array of factors 
affected the bargaining power of the PBA and the city in recent years, and it would be difficult for even 
the most impartial observer to assess which party had the upper hand. There is no question that the 
attack on the World Trade Center profoundly affected the relationship between the city and the PBA 
(and virtually everything else that occurred in New York City after September 11), but the net effect of 
9/11 on the bargaining power of the parties is problematic. 
 On the one hand, the pendulum of public opinion seemed to swing in the direction of police 
officers and firefighters after the tragic events of 9/11. As a consequence of 9/11, police officers 
assumed new anti-terrorist responsibilities, which required all officers to participate in new training 
programs. No one disputed the fact that the job of a police officer in New York City had become more 
complex and challenging. 39 More than ever, people in New York City realized how vital police officers 
were to their safety and health. Thus, it would appear that the PBAs bargaining power should have 
increased after 9/11. 
 On the other hand, 9/11 also coincided with a slump on Wall Street and a deep downturn in the 
New York City economy. In its post-hearing memorandum in 2002, the city pointed out some of the 
consequences of 9/11: over 15.7 million square feet of office space at the World Trade Center was 
destroyed and about the same amount of space was either destroyed or significantly damaged in the 
surrounding neighborhood; hundreds of small businesses were closed down, dislocating thousands of 
workers, and many never reopened; 60,000 jobs were lost in October 2001, including 24,000 in the 
finance sector. The New York City Partnership and the Chamber of Commerce estimated that the cost of 
the attack to the city of New York was 183 billion. The city estimated that it lost over $800 million in tax 
revenue as a consequence of the attack. 40 The mayor needed to obtain increases in property taxes to 
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cover projected deficits. One might assume that the city's deteriorating economic condition after 9/11 
caused the bargaining power equation to tilt in the city's favor, rather than the PBAs. On balance, 9/11 
probably did not measurably affect the balance of power between the city and the PBA. 
 
Constraints on Bargaining Power 
In the public sector, and especially in the bargaining between the city and the PBA, the latitude for 
either party to exercise bargaining power is limited. The PBA, of course, does not have the right to go on 
strike and has never seriously contemplated doing so. It would be equally risky for police officers to 
engage in other forms of job actions. They are confined to informational picketing and demonstrations 
as well as advertising in various media outlets. 41 By the same token, the city lacks the leverage a private 
sector employer would have; unlike a private employer, it cannot threaten a lockout, relocation, or the 
termination of the essential services it provides. The city has, however, sought means of reducing its 
reliance on uniformed officers. For example, during the Giuliani administration it pioneered the use of a 
computer system called Compstat as a tool for managing the police force. Compstat has been widely 
heralded as an effective crime-fighting technique. 42 In fact the size of the New York City police force 
decreased from more than 41,000 officers in 2000 to under 35,000 in 2005. 43 In the 2002 and 2004 
bargaining rounds the city contended that it had planned to reduce the size of the force because of its 
introduction of more efficient management techniques. But the PBA argued that the reduction in the 
force had not been planned but was the consequence of the city's increasing difficulties in recruiting and 
retaining officers. 44 
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Post-Hearing Negotiations 
There is no doubt that the PBA honestly believed in both the 2002 and the 2004-05 rounds that its 
demands for substantial salary increases and other contract improvements were based on the merits of 
its case—but the city seemed equally persuaded that its persistent demand in both rounds that the 
union accept the so-called citywide pattern was also based squarely on the merits. One might imagine 
that under these conditions both sides might be content to let a truly impartial arbitration panel decide 
which party was right and which party was wrong. But that is not what transpired. 
 In both rounds when formal hearings were concluded, the arbitration panel went into executive 
session, a phase of the arbitration proceeding that involved intense, private negotiations over several 
months (nearly four months in 2002 and six months in 2005), as well as close communication between 
each party-appointed arbitrator and his or her constituents. Under the gun of an award that might be 
imposed on both sides by the impartial chair (provided, of course, that he obtained the vote of one of 
the party-appointed arbitrators), the parties engaged in hard bargaining that narrowed the scope of 
their differences but did not lead to a final agreement. In the end, the impartial chair in both rounds 
wrote an award, but each chair obtained the support, or at least concurrence, of the party-appointed 
arbitrators. The protracted negotiations clearly served to narrow the differences between the parties 
and gave the chairs a clearer understanding of the parties' priorities and the tradeoffs that would or 
would not be acceptable to them. 
 
Conclusions 
In August 2002 the Eishen panel awarded the police officers an 11.75 percent increase in their salaries 
covering the contract period August 1, 2000 to July 31, 2002. Nearly three years later, in July 2005, the 
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Schmertz panel awarded the police officers a 10.25 percent increase in salaries covering the period 
August 1, 2002 to July 31, 2004. The PBA regarded these awards as victories, not only because both 
awards were significantly above the prevailing citywide pattern but also because both Eischen and 
Schmertz included in their awards language that supported one or more of the PBA's arguments for 
substantial salary adjustments. Interestingly however, the two distinguished arbitrators disagreed on 
which part of the PBA's case best justified an above pattern award. Eischen focused primarily on what 
he termed the "recruitment and retention crisis" to justify his award but was silent on other elements of 
the PBA's case. Schmertz was silent on the recruitment and retention issue but relied heavily on the 
PBA's arguments regarding the relevance of comparing the salaries of police officers in New York City 
with the salaries of police officers in cities and communities in the New York City region. After the 
awards were issued, city officials denied that the citywide pattern had actually been broken. 
 But it is easy to understand why they made such a claim. Collective bargaining between the city 
and its unions is conducted in the glare of a very bright spotlight. The press follows every twist and turn 
in the city's dealings with its unions, and every major labor conflict in New York City (such as the 2006 
transit strike) makes national headlines. Political and professional reputations and careers are at stake, 
and we observed at first hand the stress felt by all of the key players. 
 Some people may believe that New York City is unique and therefore no meaningful lessons can 
be learned from public sector collective bargaining in the city. The experience in New York City may not 
be unique but does stand in contrast to the usual practices in the private sector and many other public 
sector jurisdictions. For example, with regard to bargaining over salaries, the city's continuing insistence 
on fidelity to an alleged "pattern" stands in marked contrast to the efforts of many public and private 
managers to avoid patterns and obtain wage settlements tailored to the needs of their organizations. In 
contrast to most unions, the PBA has consistently argued that market factors, rather than patterns, 
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should determine police pay because it believes that police pay in New York City has for many years 
been significantly below market levels. 
 With regard to the interest arbitration process, the PBA and the city have reached impasse and 
relied on arbitration in every round of bargaining since the NYCCBL was passed in 1967, strongly 
suggesting the presence of a narcotic effect. We previously noted, however, that researchers have not 
found the presence of a narcotic effect in most jurisdictions where interest arbitration is used. Again, 
New York City may be sui generis. The evidence does suggest strongly that the transfer of jurisdiction 
over interest arbitration from the OCB to PERB, resulting in a change from all-neutral to tripartite 
arbitration panels, moved the parties in New York City away from the judicial prototype and toward the 
negotiation prototype.  
 We believe all public sector jurisdictions have much in common. When public sector employers 
and unions use interest arbitration, they retain considerable latitude in determining which arbitration 
prototype will be used. In this article we have explored some of the implications of that choice for the 
interest arbitration process and bargaining power, and we hope—and believe—the themes we have 
articulated have applicability in a wide variety of settings. 
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